Will the Real President Obama Please Stand Up?

Shi’ite Houthi rebels ride a patrol truck in Sanaa October 9, 2014. REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah

Mohammed Abdulmalik al-Mutawakil, one of the secular party leaders in Yemen, a scholar and a gentle soul who was admired and loved by many, was assassinated this week as he walked home in Sanaa. Regardless of who perpetrated this senseless crime, it is an ominous sign of the chaos that has already descended on this hapless country and the chaos that is yet to come. There was a time when diplomacy could have prevented the disintegration of Yemen, that time has come and gone.

The Houthi rebels (and the term rebels may not apply for much longer), having gone way past Sanaa in their military expansion, have given Yemeni President, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, 10 days to form a cabinet or face a direct takeover of power by their committee of elders. As the Houthis battle a motley collection of Al Qaeda forces, tribal militias, and remnants of the Yemeni army in southern towns and governorates, the US continues to bombard members of the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) fighters in roughly the same locations, leading to widespread speculation in Yemen and the region that a secret alliance has taken hold between the US and Iran, leading to actual collaboration on the ground between US and the Iran-supported Houthi forces.

In northern Syria and Iraq, US planes have been firing relentlessly at ISIS fighters, particularly in the town of Kobani, where the embattled Syrian Kurds have been valiantly trying to fend off an ISIS invasion. Given that ISIS has turned on the Syrian government and has invited at least the Islamist members of the Syrian opposition to join them, this again puts the US on the side of Iran and Bashar Al-Assad in confronting Sunni extremist factions. The Turks, who could with the proper inducements field ground troops to help defeat ISIS, have insisted that the US turn its fire on the Syrian regime as well, to get at the root of the chaos and mayhem going on in Syria and Iraq. The Obama administration has thus far refused to do so.

I have had a hard time in recent days, in interviews with Al Jazeera (Arabic) and the BBC Arabic service, convincing my interviewers and their Yemeni guests that the US has actually blundered into this seeming alliance and that it is in no way an actual conspiracy between the US and Iran against all Sunnis in the Middle East. Conspiracy theories are indeed commonplace in the Middle East, and suspicions are always rife that the US sees all, knows all, and is behind every nefarious development in the region. I try to convince my interlocutors that the US government is simply not that smart and not that capable to be behind all these developments and that there is in fact no American plan to dismantle the Sykes-Picot agreement (the WWI French-British agreement that drew all the currently challenged borders in the Levant) and divide up the region along sectarian and ethnic lines. The Obama administration’s actions are, nevertheless, at least partially to blame for these wild impressions and accusations. Indeed, despite an army of public affairs specialists and strategic communication experts, the US image in the region is at an all-time low, from Iran itself, to Turkey, Israel, and the entire Arab world.

From a Beleaguered Northern Tribe to a Dominant Force

When the Houthi rebellion started in 2004, the Houthis were simply the largest Zaidi tribe in northern Yemen, leading a protest at the time against the Saudi supported attempt by the central government to spread Salafi/Sunni Islam in their region. Additionally, the northern region felt neglected and left out of development funds and projects given to Yemen by foreign donors. Former president Saleh attempted to subdue the Houthis by summoning Houthi elder, Badreddine al-Houthi, to Sanaa and by stationing troops in Saadah, the capital of the northern governorate. Defiance turned into resistance and led to seven years of war between the Houthis and the central government in Sanaa. After the 2011 uprising, and taking advantage of the political chaos and power vacuum in Sanaa, the Houthis fought off the Yemeni army and defeated and expelled the armed members of a major Salafi school, the Damaj institute, from their midst. Having faced Salafi militias from Sanaa (from the Muslim Brotherhood dominated Islah party) and occasional forays by AQAP, the Houthis, under the guise of fighting off these “invading” forces, continued their war into the governorates of Amran and Shabwa, reaching in the spring and summer of 2014 the outskirts of Sanaa.

Steps Toward Dominance

Despite signing agreements with the National Dialogue Committee, brokered by UN envoy Jamal Benomar, and with the new president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the Houthi’s appetite had been whetted by successes on the battlefield and by growing assistance from Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, into threatening Sanaa under the pretext of seeking economic and political reforms. After establishing street presence via civilian demonstrations, the Houthis eventually sent troops into Sanaa and took the capital with only token resistance from the army. It was widely speculated that troops still loyal to former president Saleh were ordered by the latter not to resist. Saleh, long angered by leading General Ali Mohsen, and the leading Islahi family, the al-Ahmars, struck an alliance with the Houthis and gave orders to military leaders still loyal to him to stand down and allow the Houthis to advance unopposed.

Where Things Stand

After establishing dominance in Sanaa, Houthi forces continued south, taking Hodeida, the important commercial port city, and going East to the Hadramout region, taking Marib, the oil producing region, in the process. Currently, local tribes, army units still loyal to president Hadi, as well as AQAP elements, are putting up a stiff resistance to the advancing Houthi fighters. From Hodeida, the strategic waterway of Bab el Mandeb, is within striking distance, as is Aden, the capital city of the south. If their current string of military successes continues, the Houthis will soon have all of Yemen under their control. Not wanting a war with the southern coalition known as Hirak, the Houthis are attempting to strike an alliance with the southern parties by promising them a large share of any new government formed in Sanaa. As a sign of their growing confidence, the Houthis have declined to name their own prime minister, or indeed to say how many seats in the new government they would like to have. Houthi leader, Abdul-Malik, has instead given president Hadi an ultimatum: form a new government within 10 days or we will establish a council of elders to rule Yemen. Houthi’s militiamen already control the main ministries and government buildings in Sanaa and are ensuring that government officials do not make any decisions counter to their wishes.

So What?

The US has, since 2011, given some economic assistance to president Hadi’s transitional government and lip service to the democratic process underway in Yemen since 2011. The highest investment of attention and money, however, has been given to pursuing AQAP elements with drone and airstrikes. The confluence of US airstrikes, and ground strikes by the Houthis against AQAP, give the impression of connivance. In fact, the USG to date has not had any direct contact with the Houthis, and rhetoric on both sides has been hostile.

While the US has been busy (ineffectively) pounding AQAP members across southern Yemen, Iran’s influence has grown in leaps and bounds over the past few months. Iran has friends and allies all over Yemen, but Iranian funds and weapons have been particularly instrumental in the Houthis’ military successes. When the Obama administration wakes up to the impending domination of the country by a group who’s slogan is: “Death to America, Curse be upon the Jews and Victory to Islam,” it will have become too costly to try to reverse the facts on the ground. Further, should Iran’s guns, via the Houthi militia, reach Bab el Mandeb, they would pose a threat to the entrance to the Red Sea, hence directly impacting the American national interest.

The image problem is no less serious: For three years, the US despite saying “Assad must go,” has refused to do anything to advance that goal. This year, with the sudden takeover of northwestern Iraq by the Islamic State organization (ISIS, ISIL, or simply IS), the US dispatched its air force, striking ISIS forces near the Kurdish regions of Iraq and in an attempt to break the siege in northern Syria of the Kurdish city of Kobani. There has been tacit admission by US officials that Iran, which has troops on the ground in northern Iraq and military advisors to the Assad regime in Syria, has been given advance notice of US/allied airstrikes. While such actions have been individually explained, and possibly justified, little attention has been given to the overall picture that Iran’s influence in the region is being aided and abetted by the US, and that it looks to allies like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, let alone the rank and file Sunni Muslims of the area, that there is actual collusion between Iran and the US. The rationale, as explained to me by Yemeni friends, is that the regular armed forces of Yemen have failed at containing AQAP. The US, according to this narrative, now trusts the Houthis to do the job. Similarly in northern Iraq and Syria, Syrian oppositionists to Assad are saying, perhaps the US has now given the signal to Iran that it no longer cares about Assad’s continuance in power as long as the Sunni extremists in the region are fought and minorities (read, the Yazidis and Kurds) are protected.

It would be one thing if all this were part of a deliberate strategy by the US—via an upfront agreement with Iran that establishes an understanding on stopping the rivalry and proxy wars with Saudi Arabia, and that terrorist plots by Iran and Hezbollah are put in check. Quite another matter, however, when Iran and its allied militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, are gradually acquiring the upper hand in the regional struggle for power, and the US is seen as at best looking the other way and at worst aiding and abetting such takeover. Iran remains to date an enemy of the US. By assisting one’s enemy and causing friends and allies to lose faith, the US is setting itself up for almost universal enmity in the region. After full withdrawal from Afghanistan, US troops will no longer be in harm’s way in the region, but our diplomats and friends had better tread very carefully.

Better Late than Never?

US Secretary of State John Kerry (R) shakes hands with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at the United Nations Palais in Geneva November 24, 2013. REUTERS/Carolyn Kaster/Pool

The US finally has a strategy to defeat ISIS, or simply the Islamic State (IS) as it now describes itself. The main component of the strategy, involving pushing for political reconciliation in Iraq and getting Kurds and Sunnis to help the central government of Iraq fight the extremists, is something that was urgently needed at least five years ago—years wasted in mollycoddling Nouri al-Maliki when he could have been pressured to do the right thing by his own people or resign much earlier than he did. Better late than never!

The strategy also involves a role for Saudi Arabia, in concert with the new government in Iraq—again, a reconciliation, perhaps, which has been sometime in coming. The strategy also has a Syria angle, promising to finally work with the Free Syria Army (FSA), after three years of having promised but failed to do so. The strategy makes sense on paper but ignores the elephant in the room: Iran and its unholy alliance with the Assad regime in Syria. Additionally, the dozen or so states that have agreed to contribute to the fight have separate and often conflicting agendas. Finally, the FSA is on its last leg and may at this point be unsalvageable. The fight against ISIS is beginning to look like an orchestra whose disparate members have never trained together, trying to play on a stage the maestro has already abandoned.

Sometimes, the enemy of my enemy is still my enemy. Iran and the US have conflicting strategic interests that reflect on the futures of Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and the Israel-Palestine conflict, not to mention Saudi Arabia and how the broader Middle East should interact with the United States and Europe. The US needs a broad understanding with Iran if the campaign against ISIS is to succeed and if an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program is to be worth the combined efforts of the P5 + 1. Iran’s leaders, having committed men, material, and funds to the survival of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, have taken the US airstrikes in Iraq gladly but have already denounced plans to carry out strikes inside Syria, worried that once over Syrian skies, US planes could change targets and attack the Assad regime’s military machine—a machine which has wreaked havoc and destruction on its own people over the past three years. This naivety of coordinating with Iran (and, yes, a certain amount of necessary coordination is taking place) on narrow security interests while ignoring the larger questions has happened before under the Bush administration, when we discussed security issues with Iran’s military and IRGC leaders in Iraq, 2007-2009. Iran took full advantage of the talks, specifically gaining reassurance that its borders and fighters would not be targeted by coalition forces, all while forging ahead with its own policies of working with the Assad regime in Syria who was funneling Jihadi fighters into Iraq, sending arms, and funding the construction of an arms industry to serve Hezbollah and other Shia militias in the region and plotting against Gulf regimes and planning terrorist activities internationally. There is no reason to assume the same behavior is not currently ongoing as we work in tandem against ISIS in Iraq.

In practical terms, specific areas of conflict with Iran include the role of Shia militias, in both Iraq and Syria, armed and trained by Iran and Hezbollah. Such groups as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), have committed atrocities against Sunnis all over Iraq, including recently in Baghdad. The behavior of such elements in the field is highly problematic, especially as the new government is trying to win back Sunni communities to its side. Additionally, although the new cabinet in Iraq has already drawn praise from the US and Europe, it remains incomplete while the critical posts of Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior are still unfilled. The Sunnis have long demanded that security positions be filled by Sunni personalities, as long as Iraq’s security forces remained centralized. AAH and KH are pushing for these positions to remain in Shia hands. This is not a mere conflict over seats in the cabinet; both sides see the matter as vital to their security interests. Iran has allowed the transition to a new prime minister, albeit one from the same political party as Nouri al-Maliki. Iran, however, has not necessarily given the new PM a free-hand in appeasing and drawing in Sunni leaders in his own country. In Syria, the problem is much the same, as Shia and Alawite militias continue to do the dirty work for the Assad regime, ensuring the virtual impossibility of reconciliation between the different communities under current circumstances.

As for the other members of this new coalition of the willing, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, problems of coordinating with Iran are made even more difficult. Iran would certainly not welcome Saudi forces anywhere near its borders, this is assuming Saudi Arabia wants to send them. Saudi forces have rarely ventured outside their own borders, and when they have done so it was for a minimal police role in neighboring Bahrain, and a disastrous campaign against the Houthis in northern Yemen. The experience of Saudis and Emirati fighter-bombers is not much better than that of their ground forces, especially that it is not clear, without a NATO mandate, who exactly would be coordinating all these strikes over Iraq: the US or France?

The lack of clarity of the Syria side of the equation in the President’s strategy has been amply commented on by others. Suffice it to say, the Free Syria Army has lost ground, fighters, and commanders in three years of virtually no funding and of creeping ascendance of Islamist forces. While training those that remain in Turkey or Jordan would make the most sense because of the proximity to the fight, their training in Saudi Arabia makes no sense, especially if the idea is that Saudi forces would be doing the training. The fact that Saudi Arabia has no common borders with Syria, the backgrounder by a senior White House official notwithstanding, makes the logistics of sending them in and out of Syria as needed very complicated to say the least.

Finally, and as the President rightly notes, solving the ISIS problem is necessarily a long term venture. The Arab regimes that have joined the coalition are part of the problem, not the solution. ISIS has appealed to Sunni youth all over the Arab world based on their frustration with being marginalized in their own societies. ISIS has cleverly been using social media to appeal to and recruit young fighters from across the Arab/Islamic world and beyond. A recent Twitter message says to young Sunnis, “you have tried monarchies and socialist government and they have failed you. It is time to go back to an authentic Islamic government.”

President Obama, at the outbreak of the Arab Uprising in 2011, said that the US wants to be, indeed, has to be, on the right side of history. Young reformers in the region thought at the time that US policy would shift away from its security alliances with governments that consistently abused their human rights, to at least rhetorically supporting the rights of people of the region to rulers that practiced good governance. The US strategy against ISIS, compared by the President to the war against terrorism in Yemen and Somalia, is a return to the Global War on Terrorism of a decade ago, and to a coalition of the willing, consisting of governments that have been the cause of alienating their youth right into the arms of ISIS in the first place.

Only in Lebanon

Bitter Friends and Rivals, Aoun and Geagea (REUTERS/ Khalil Hassan)

I was on the phone with my sister in Lebanon recently when sounds of gunfire (from her end, of course) interrupted the conversation. Not being able to ascertain the cause right away, my sister called me back after we hung up to reassure me that the gunfire was “only celebratory” on the part of those happy with the announced victory of Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian presidential elections. We both chuckled and made jokes, but the irony stayed with me: the pro-Assad Lebanese were celebrating the victory of a reelected president next door, while failing to elect one for their own country–the process having stalemated after four aborted attempts, leaving the post vacant for the time being.

Obama’s West Point Speech: Less than Meets the Eye!

U.S. President Obama hands a diploma to a graduate during commencement ceremony at the United States Military Academy at West Point (REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque)

In his May 28 speech at West Point, President Obama outlined yet again his foreign policy vision, including specific references to his Syria policy. His speech, though it included a reference to “working with Congress to help those who fight dictatorship and terrorism in Syria,” has already drawn a less than enthusiastic reaction from the Syrian political opposition and a skeptical reception by Middle East analysts. The speech was first and foremost political, responding to his critics at home to the left and right of the political spectrum—placing his policy squarely in the middle, in between isolationism and unrestrained military intervention. On specifics concerning Syria, it left those looking for new initiatives wondering, “where’s the beef?”

What’s Showing in Middle East Theaters This Week

Three Middle East issues of note this week: The Lebanese presidential election/selection process has kicked off, almost unnoted by US media; Bandar Bin-Sultan, former Saudi Ambassador to Washington and, until recently, the Kingdom’s intelligence chief, was retired from his post, almost certainly against his will—a rarity in Saudi royal protocol; and, last but certainly not least, the Palestinians have announced a reconciliation between Hamas, more or less in control of Gaza, and Fatah, in control of the West Bank, or at least those parts of it that Israel allows Mahmoud Abbas to control. These are three important events, pregnant with nuances and implications.

The first round of voting took place this week in the Lebanese parliament for a new president of the republic. Since no candidate received a two-third majority required for a first ballot victory, the vote now goes into a second round next week, where the successful candidate could win by a simple majority—half the full membership plus one. A quorum still requires the presence of two-thirds of the members for the vote to count. The failed vote highlighted two political facts: One, there is no consensus between the two main political blocs on a way forward in Lebanon and, two, Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), long the dominant military force in Lebanon, has demonstrated that it is also the dominant political force in the country.

The constitution requires a two-third majority for a first round victory in the Lebanese presidential race. Out of a total of 128 potential votes, the only officially declared candidate with an actual platform, Samir Geagea, received 48 votes–almost the full vote of the Saad Hariri March 14 bloc. March 8, led by Hezbollah, did not field a candidate, but the 52 members of their coalition put in blank pieces of paper for their ballots and walked out of parliament before the votes were counted. Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader who normally carries the 10 swing votes in parliament, fielded another Christian candidate, Henri Helou, definitely a non-serious candidate meant to siphon away votes from Geagea.

Some of the independent members of parliament apparently cast protest votes, using the names of people who were killed during Lebanon’s civil war, and for whose death Geagea was convicted and received 12 years in prison when the war ended in 1990. Hezbollah blocked Geagea’s candidacy, not for anything he did during the civil war but because his platform clearly opposed LH on its policy of intervention in Syria, its taking matters into its own hands in questions of war and peace with Israel and, most importantly, on its retaining weapons and militia and refusal to submit to the principle that only the state could legitimately exercise the use of force. That the party did not field a candidate of its own–and presumably, if they did, that would be their Maronite ally Michel Aoun – is testimony to their inability to contribute anything positive to the current political, social, and economic stalemate in Lebanon. They have been content, thus far, to play the spoiler, and show that any presidential candidate who does not respect their red lines shall not be elected. Full stop!

On the second story, one that has quickly passed from the front pages of most media, national or international, is Bandar Bin-Sultan’s second demise. Second, because he passed through a period of political limbo after leaving Washington in 2005, despite being appointed head of the then newly created Saudi National Security Council, and particularly during the first two years of the Obama administration. Bandar resurfaced as Saudi Arabia’s intelligence chief in 2012, seemingly already deeply preoccupied with the Syria file. His replacement last week as intel chief has been linked to his having lost the Syria file to his cousin Mohammed Bin-Nayef. Ironically, the speculation has centered mostly on the princely rivalry between the two, and on the control of the Syria file, as one of the most important on the Kingdom’s foreign policy agenda these days. What the analysts have glossed over is that Bandar has not so much lost the file as he has lost the war! From his perch as intelligence chief, Bandar ran the war in Syria much like an underground activity, coordinating illicit funds, foreign fighters with uncertain missions, including perhaps some assassination plots, using tactics somewhat reminiscent of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Iran-Contra affair, as well as cloak and dagger intrigue of the kind Israel and Hezbollah operatives engage in, the one against the other from time to time. Trouble is, this is a different era from the 1980s, and Syria is a different war from Afghanistan.

Ultimately, Bandar is an amateur plotter when he doesn’t have big powers behind him. With Iran and Hezbollah throwing their full weight behind Bashar al-Assad, and the west staying out of the fray, Bandar’s mismanagement of the Syria war looked amateurish indeed. His decommissioning is a recognition that the Assad regime is winning the war, but it is not a clear sign that Saudi Arabia now has a new strategy.  Much like the Obama administration, Saudi Arabia still wants Bashar out but seems to be in between strategies when it comes to finding a way to make their wish come true.

Finally, Palestinian reconciliation. We’ve seen this movie before: it doesn’t end well. Theoretically, it makes sense for all concerned parties to believe in it and help make it happen, using the new energy and optimism it would inevitably produce on the Palestinian side to reenergize the peace process. Why would anyone negotiate Palestinian-Israeli peace with Mahmoud Abbas when he can’t even speak for the organization that spawned him, Fatah? He is often derisively referred to by his own people as the mayor of Ramallah. Hamas, despite heavy odds, has held on to leadership and control of Gaza, despite a harsh Israeli siege and despite challenges by Palestinian factions more eager than Hamas for another war with Israel. Abbas has been trying to appear tougher with the Israelis, and has therefore opted for pressing ahead with UN committee memberships. Hamas has been trying to appear more moderate and more in control of the harder line factions in Gaza to appeal to the new military leadership in Egypt–whom they vitally need to obtain relief from time to time at the Rafah crossing. A reconciliation between the two organizations would challenge them to unify their strategies and allow them to present a unified position on a peace agreement with Israel, one that would  then have the approval of the majority of the Palestinian population behind it.

That would be far too logical and rational though, and we do not live in a rational world. Palestinians have reconciled before, only to be foiled by the people who helped them reconcile – often the Egyptian military intelligence establishment – or by their own rivalry and plotting against one another, or by outright hostility and threats by both Israel and the United States–and both have now threatened to impose sanctions and further restrictions of access to the outside world on a people who are already living like so many mice in a mousetrap. If you think this movie has a happy ending, I have some scenic property to sell you right on Chicago’s Lake Shore Drive, real cheap.

Who the World Is Negotiating with in Geneva

“Each and every day that the barrel-bombing of Aleppo continues, the Assad regime reminds the world of its true colors. It is the latest barbaric act of a regime that has committed organized, wholesale torture, used chemical weapons, and is starving whole communities by blocking delivery of food to Syrian civilians in urgent need.”

This is not my assertion. This comes from a statement made by our Secretary of State, John Kerry, on February 4. Our professor-in-chief, President Obama, has made similar statements in the past, and then moved on to other items on his agenda for the day. Our diplomat-in-chief, John Kerry, makes this statement and then moves on to practicing the art of diplomacy—planning another session at Geneva where he no doubt will be insulted, yet again, by Syria’s thug-in-chief, Foreign Minister Walid Muallem.

Beyond the Headlines

Three Middle East topics that apparently did not pass muster as headline grabbers this week are nonetheless important. Two potentially hopeful events took place in Tunisia and Yemen, and one anticlimactic, if still important, development concerning Lebanon.

Welcome to the Middle East Corner

In a world where international interests and powers continue to clash in and over the Middle East, what happens in the region matters, in and of itself, and particularly for US foreign policy and national security.

This blog will serve as a platform for dialogue on such matters. I will freely share my insights — those of a Middle East scholar, with over 25 years of experience as an American diplomat in the region — to identify events and ironies worthy of attention. Your views and reactions are encouraged. Guest posts are also welcome. Please contact me if you would be interested in sharing your own thoughts on the Middle East Corner.

I will inaugurate the Corner with a look at last week’s speech made by Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, and ironically similar remarks made by Secretary of State John Kerry.

In front of a live audience in Beirut – itself a rarity, since he normally gives speeches from an underground location via a video link – Nasrallah surprised many in Lebanon by defending the current negotiations and attempts to reach an understanding between Iran and the West.

On the same day, Secretary of State John Kerry spoke to the US Senate banking committee seeking to block additional sanctions on Iran, in favor of reaching an understanding with Hezbollah’s main sponsor in the region.

Both Nasrallah and Kerry warned that the alternative to an agreement would be war. Nasrallah, justifying his support for Iranian president Rohani’s approach to the West, took the logic of an understanding further than the nuclear question and said that a political solution to the Syrian conflict would be a win-win situation for all concerned. He very cleverly placed himself and his party in the corner of the wise and the pragmatic. He portrayed his opponents — the pro-West Lebanese March 14 party and their patron, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia — as the extremists trying to block political progress in Lebanon and a regional agreement which could bring an end to the fighting in Syria.

Kerry, according to his critics on the Hill, was not very specific in making his arguments for a rapprochement with Iran. And there’s the rub: Nasrallah made it clear in presenting his case, that the Assad-Iran-Hezbollah coalition would be negotiating from a position of strength, and that any agreement reached would make them even stronger.  Kerry, on the other hand, has so far been unable to make such promises, given that the details of an agreement with Iran remain vague, and the Syrian opposition has a very weak hand with which to negotiate with the Syrian regime.

The timing of an agreement between Iran (and Hezbollah) and the West favors the former. For any win by the US (and the West), the devil is in the details – and those details, as part of a winning strategy, have yet to be clarified by the Obama administration.